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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] Regardless of the quality, a knockoff handbag is still a knockoff.  It 
was on this premise that Gucci America, Inc. filed suit against Daffy’s, 
Inc. for selling counterfeit Gucci handbags.1  Gucci alleged that Daffy’s 
violated its trademark protection under the Lanham Act.2  In the lawsuit, 
Gucci asserted that it was concerned about the possible confusion of 
consumers who purchased counterfeit “Jackie-O” handbags, believing 
them to be genuine Gucci products.3  Neither the district court nor the 
circuit court allowed Gucci relief against Daffy’s.4  This note examines 
how that decision fits within the Lanham Act. 
 
II. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 
 
A. Historical Perspective on Trademarks 
 
 
* Sarah Cone is currently a second-year law student at the T. C. Williams School of Law 
at the University of Richmond in Richmond, Virginia. 
1 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy’s, Inc., No. CIV.A.00-4463, 2000 WL 1720738, at *1 (D.N.J. 
Nov. 14, 2000). 
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2000). 
3 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy’s, Inc., 354 F.3d 228, 234 (3d Cir. 2003). 
4 Id. at 229. 
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[2]  In ancient Rome, trademarks served much the same purpose as 
they do in the United States today.5 They helped consumers identify the 
creator of an object while creating a connection between the quality of the 
product and the creator’s name.6  Even wine jugs in ancient Rome were 
marked with details such as the manufacturer and creation date to protect 
the producers.7  In the Middle Ages, paintings could be protected from 
trademark infringement, and innkeepers who sold ordinary wine under a 
false name could be hanged in the Fourteenth Century.8 
 
B. The Lanham Act 
 
1. Provisions 
 
[3] The Lanham Act is the current federal statute governing trademark 
registration and infringement.9  The Act permits civil action against 
anyone who 
 
[U]ses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or 
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation 
of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or 
misleading representation of fact, which is likely to cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with 
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval 
of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by 
another person . . . .10 
 
Under the statute, a plaintiff may be entitled to profits, damages, and costs 
of the action if there is “a violation under section 1125(a) or (d) … or a 
willful violation under section 1125(c).”11 
 
                                                 
5 Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trademarks, 9 MICH. L. REV. 
29, 30 (1911). 
6 Jed S. Rakoff & Ira B. Wolff, Commercial Counterfeiting: The Inadequacy of Existing 
Remedies, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 493, 496-97 (1983). 
7 Id. at 496. 
8 Rogers, supra note 5, at 32-33. 
9 1 JEROME GILSON ET AL., TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.04(3)(a) 
(51st ed. 2004). 
10 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)-(a)(1)(A) (2000). 
11 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).  Section 1125(c) enumerates remedies for the “dilution of famous 
marks”; section 1125(d) discusses cyberpiracy, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)-(d). 
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2. In Need of Botox 
 
[4] The judicial circuits are “effectively the courts of last resort” in 
trademark infringement cases because “Congress rarely intercedes, and … 
the Supreme Court has other things on its mind.”12  Despite the existence 
of the Lanham Act, “each circuit continues to create and apply its own 
version of trademark law.”13  For instance, in the Second Circuit “willful 
deceptiveness” is a hurdle to an award of profits,14 while the Seventh 
Circuit does not require willfulness to  “justify an award of profits.”15  
“Each circuit has developed its own test for deciding whether or not to 
grant preliminary injunctive relief.”16  Most circuits consider the 
likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury to the plaintiff, 
injury to the defendant versus injury to the plaintiff, and public interest.17  
However, the Second and Ninth Circuits require fewer of these 
considerations, and the Seventh Circuit splits them into a two-tiered test.18  
Even those courts that consider the same factors do so in an inconsistent 
way.19  Inconsistent holdings, as well as court-invented doctrines and 
standards, permeate trademark litigation, leading some to believe the 
precedent surrounding the Lanham Act may need a “face-lift.”20  
Unfortunately, Congress may not be prepared for a complete overhaul of 
the Act,21 leaving different rules in force in different circuits.22 
 
III. DESIGNER V. DISCOUNTER 
 
A. Case History 
 
                                                 
12 JEROME GILSON & ANNE GILSON LALONDE, THE LANHAM ACT: TIME FOR A 
FACE-LIFT? 1 (2002). 
13 Id. at 3. 
14 Id. at 19 (quoting George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1537 (2d Cir. 
1992)). 
15 Id. at 20 (quoting Ruolo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989)).   
16 3 JEROME GILSON ET AL., TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 
14.02(3)(b) (51st ed. 2004).   
17 Id.   
18 Id.   
19 Id. (explaining that the Fourth Circuit permits an injunction if there is a “decided 
imbalance,” yet the Eighth and Tenth Circuits look for a need “for more deliberate 
investigation”).   
20 JEROME GILSON & ANNE GILSON LALONDE, THE LANHAM ACT: TIME FOR A 
FACE-LIFT? 1 (2002).    
21 Id. at 22. 
22 Id. at 3.  
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1. The Purchase and Sale of Gucci Handbags 
 
 [5] Daffy’s sells popular brands of clothing at discount prices.23  
Among the items it once sold were Gucci handbags.24  Daffy’s bought 594 
handbags from supplier Sara’s Collection, Inc. for $238 to $250 each; the 
bags appeared to be Gucci’s “Jackie-O” model.25  Because Sara’s 
Collection was not in Gucci’s authorized chain of distribution, Daffy’s 
decided to exercise “an excess of caution.”26  Daffy’s attempted to 
authenticate the bags through an inspection by a salesclerk at a New Jersey 
Gucci outlet store and by sending one for repair to the Gucci repair center 
in New York.27  The salesclerk examined the bag, compared it to another 
in the store, and told the Daffy’s employee who made the inquiry that it 
was authentic Gucci.28  Because the damaged bag was repaired and 
returned without question, Daffy’s concluded it too was genuine.29  
Daffy’s sold 588 of the bags before receiving a letter from Gucci insisting 
that it stop selling the bags and disclose its supplier.30  Despite the belief 
that it had done nothing wrong, Daffy’s removed the remaining handbags 
from its stores.31 
 
2. Gucci’s Lawsuit 
 
[6] Gucci filed suit for an Order to Show Cause why Daffy’s should 
not be enjoined from selling the counterfeit bags and for expedited 
discovery of Daffy’s supplier.32  The district court first evaluated whether 
or not the bags were authentic.33  The bags did turn out to be counterfeit, 
but were virtually indistinguishable from genuine Gucci bags.34  The court 
then considered Gucci’s requests for a recall, an injunction forbidding 
Daffy to use the Gucci trademark, a finding of willful infringement, and 
                                                 
23 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy’s, Inc., 354 F.3d 228, 229 (3d Cir. 2003). 
24 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy’s, Inc., No. CN.A.00-4463, 2000 WL 1720738, at *1 (D.N.J. 
Nov. 14, 2000). 
25 Gucci, 354 F.3d at 229. 
26 Gucci, 2000 WL 1720738, at *1. 
27 Gucci, 354 F.3d at 230. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 230-31. 
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the profits from Daffy’s sales.35  Finding only that Daffy’s had infringed 
Gucci’s trademark, the court denied all of Gucci’s requests.36  On appeal, 
the Third Circuit affirmed the ruling.37 
 
B. The Majority Opinion 
 
[7] The circuit court examined the decision of the district court for an 
abuse of discretion.38  It explained that an abuse of discretion has occurred 
if there has been an error in fact-finding, in legal conclusions, or in 
applying the law to the facts.39  Although Gucci requested a recall of the 
counterfeit products, the court did not agree that the public benefit of such 
an action would outweigh harm to Daffy’s, which the court deemed an 
innocent infringer.40  The court also reviewed Gucci’s request for an 
injunction against Daffy’s, as well as an award of lost profits.41 
 
1. Injunctive Relief 
 
[8] The court could grant injunctive relief “according to the principles 
of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable.”42  After 
Daffy’s pulled the counterfeit Gucci handbags from its shelves, it 
“voluntarily enacted” a policy of “not dealing in Gucci products.”43  
Unsatisfied with what it considered an impermanent arrangement, Gucci 
asked the court to grant a permanent injunction court-ordering this policy 
and protecting Gucci from potential future infringement.44 
[9] Considerations for a permanent injunction, as required by the Third 
Circuit in Shields v. Zuccarini, include “actual success on the merits,” 
irreparable injury from denial of the injunction, greater harm to defendant 
from granting the injunction, and the public interest.45  The court admitted 
that “ ‘trademark infringement amounts to irreparable injury as a matter of 
                                                 
35 Id. at 231. 
36 Id. at 231-32. 
37 Id. at 229. 
38 Id. at 233. 
39 Id. (citing Charles Jacquin Et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 921 F.2d 467, 472 
(3d Cir. 1990) (quoting International Union United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. 
Implement Workers of Am. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 820 F.2d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 1987)). 
40 Gucci, 354 F.3d at 234. 
41 Id. at 235. 
42 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2000). 
43 Gucci, 354 F.3d at 236. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 236-37 (citing Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
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law,’” even in the case of a high-quality counterfeit.46  However, Gucci 
did not argue loss of control until its appeal.  The court concluded “that 
aspect of irreparable injury was [sic] therefore been waived.”47 
 
[10] Additionally, Gucci claimed that it was up to Daffy’s to refute 
future harm.48  The court considered Gucci’s arguments in light of a case 
involving Barney, the purple dinosaur.49  The Third Circuit noted that the 
defendant in the Barney case continued to rent the costumes after being 
informed of the infringement and that the plaintiff lacked control over the 
behavior of the person inside the costume.50  In that case, the 
circumstances required a permanent injunction.51  The Third Circuit 
explained, however, that the injunction prohibiting future costume rentals 
did not automatically require an injunction against Daffy’s because the 
infringements were not analogous.52  The Barney trademark could suffer 
much more harm through the actions of costume renters than could Gucci 
from the sale of high-quality bags.53  Therefore, the appellate court 
determined that the district court did not overstep its discretion in refusing 
Gucci’s request under the Shields test.54 
 
2. Profits 
 
[11] Gucci was eligible to recover Daffy’s profits “subject to the 
principles of equity.”55  The district court relied on SecuraComm 
Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc.56 to assess the principle of equity as it 
applied to Gucci and Daffy’s.57  The court in SecuraComm explained that 
                                                 
46 Gucci, 354 F.3d at 237 (quoting S & R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., 968 F.2d 371, 
378 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
47 Gucci, 354 F.3d at 237. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 237-38.  Lyons Partnership v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 
2001), involved the rental of costumes that looked similar to the characters on the popular 
children’s show. 
50 Gucci, 354 F.3d at 238, 239 n.12. 
51 Id. at 239. 
52 Id. at 238, 239 n.12. 
53 Id. at 238, 239 n.12. 
54 Id. at 238-39. 
55 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000). 
56 166 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 1999). 
57 Gucci, 354 F.3d at 239. 
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willful infringement is central to awarding profits.58  When the Third 
Circuit decided SecuraComm, the Lanham Act’s language read: 
 
[w]hen a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark 
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a 
violation under section 43(a), shall have been established in 
any civil action arising under this Act, the plaintiff shall be 
entitled … to recover (1) defendant’s profits, (2) any 
damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the 
action.59 
 
Gucci claimed that amendments to the Lanham Act since SecuraComm 
have clarified Congress’ intention to require willfulness only in situations 
involving the dilution of a famous mark.60  The Act now reads: 
 
[w]hen a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark 
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, a violation 
under section 43(a) or (d), or a willful violation under 
section 43(c), shall have been established in any civil action 
arising under this Act, the plaintiff shall be entitled … to 
recover (1) defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained 
by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action.61 
 
However, in Quick Technologies, Inc. v. Sage Group PLC, 62 the court 
refused “to adopt a bright-line rule in which a showing of willful 
infringement is a prerequisite to an accounting of profits.”63  Instead, the 
Fifth Circuit deemed willfulness “an important factor which must be 
considered when determining whether an accounting of profits is 
appropriate.”64  The Third Circuit recognized that equitable factors should 
still be considered, including whether or not there was willful 
infringement, and determined that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by not awarding Daffy’s profits to Gucci.65 
 
                                                 
58 SecuraComm, 166 F.3d at 187. 
59 Id. at 186 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2000)). 
60 Gucci, 354 F.3d at 240. 
61 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000) (emphasis added). 
62 313 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2002). 
63 Id. at 349. 
64 Id. 
65 Gucci, 354 F.3d at 241-42. 
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C. The Dissent 
 
[12] Judge Rosenn dissented, pointing out that the district court ignored 
that one purpose of the trademark statute is “to protect the public from 
deceit.”66  Rosenn argued that the court’s decision did “nothing to 
discourage trade-mark infringement.”67 
 
1. Injunctive Relief 
 
[13] Although Judge Rosenn cited the Shields test as the appropriate 
determination for whether to issue an injunction, he disagreed that the 
burden of proof was on Gucci to prove irreparable harm.68  Instead, he 
alleged that the burden was on Daffy’s to prove otherwise because of the 
majority’s admission that “trademark infringement amounts to irreparable 
injury as a matter of law.”69  For the same reason, Judge Rosenn refuted 
the majority’s assertion that Gucci waived its claim of irreparable harm.70  
Further, he explained the need for an injunction because “[n]o legal 
obligation prevents Daffy’s from … resuming sales of purported Gucci 
products.”71  He pointed out “[t]he unwillingness of Daffy’s to stipulate 
that in the future it would not sell Gucci bags” as justification for issuing 
the injunction.72 
 
2. Profits 
 
[14] Agreeing with Gucci, Judge Rosenn explained that amendments to 
the Lanham Act superseded SecuraComm: “[t]he specific inclusion of the 
word ‘willful’ prior to ‘violation’ in the same sentence with the word 
‘violation’ without any adjective suggests an intentional contrast between 
the requirements for proving each type of violation.”73  Without 
willfulness, an equitable remedy requires the trademark owner not “retain 
the beneficial interest.”74  Judge Rosenn claimed that the majority 
                                                 
66 Id. at 244 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). 
67 Id. (Rosenn, J., dissenting). 
68 Id. at 247 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). 
69 Id. at 247-48 (Rosenn, J., dissenting) (quoting S & R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., 968 
F.2d 371, 378 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
70 Id. at 248 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). 
71 Id. at 249 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). 
72 Id. (Rosenn., J., dissenting). 
73 Id. at 245 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). 
74 Id. at 246 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). 
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unreasonably burdened Gucci to prove that Daffy’s customers purchased 
the handbags because of the Gucci name, but “[i]t cannot be seriously 
doubted that customers paid a premium for the Gucci name.”75 
 
[15] Judge Rosenn also refuted the majority’s characterization of 
Daffy’s as an innocent infringer because of the high-risk nature of the 
discount business and the purchase of the Gucci handbags from a business 
outside of Gucci’s distribution chain.76  He claimed that Daffy’s 
authentication attempt was “simply a superficial effort to cover itself in 
the event of a lawsuit.”77  Between the innocent infringer and the innocent 
infringed, the equities favor the latter.78  Since equity principles favored 
Gucci, and willfulness is not a requirement for awarding profits, Gucci 
was eligible to recover profits against Daffy’s. 
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
[16] Gucci is perhaps among the most recognized names in the fashion 
world.  Its reputation and relatively high price tags make Gucci a likely 
target for counterfeiters looking to make a quick dollar.  Although Gucci 
was the victim of counterfeiting,79 the Third Circuit held that the district 
court’s denial of injunctive relief and profits under the Lanham Act was 
reasonable.80 
 
A. Injunctive Relief 
 
1. The Standard 
 
[17] The Lanham Act permits courts to grant an injunction “according 
to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem 
reasonable, to prevent the violation of any right of the registrant of a mark. 
. . .”81  It does not, however, enumerate the principles of equity or which 
terms are “reasonable.”  Therefore, a court must look to precedent and 
apply its interpretation of the law to the facts of the case. 
 
                                                 
75 Id. at 246-47 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). 
76 Id. at 244 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). 
77 Id. (Rosenn, J., dissenting). 
78 Id. at 246 (quoting Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
79 Gucci, 354 F.3d at 230. 
80 Id. at 229. 
81 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2000). 
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2. Third Circuit Precedent 
 
[18] Under the Shields test, the district court was required to consider 
four factors in assessing a request for injunctive relief.82  Irreparable injury 
is one of these four factors.83  Even if the dissent correctly characterized 
the lack of an irreparable harm waiver, the district court still had discretion 
in evaluating the other considerations.84  After determining that the 
handbags were counterfeit, the district court considered the factors of 
harm to the defendant and the public interest.85  The Third Circuit 
considered the district court’s decision and deemed it reasonable in light 
of the Shields test.86 
 
3. In Other Circuits 
 
[19] In the Eleventh Circuit, the issuance of an injunction is “an 
extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant 
clearly established the ‘burden of persuasion’ as to all four elements.”87  
However, the Sixth Circuit described the same factors as considerations 
“to be balanced and not prerequisites that must be satisfied.”88  As each 
appellate court may have different interpretations of how to apply the 
same or similar factors, it follows that the district courts also evaluate the 
factors differently.  Thus, the district court could still have deemed an 
injunction inappropriate. 
 
B. Profits 
 
1. Requiring Willfulness 
 
[20] Deciding when to award an accounting of profits has been the least 
clear issue surrounding the Lanham Act in federal jurisprudence.89  Based 
                                                 
82 Gucci, 354 F.3d at 236-37. 
83 Id. at 236.  
84 See supra Part III.C.1. 
85 Gucci, 354 F.3d at 236-37. 
86 Id. at 238-39. 
87 Davidoff & Cie S.A. v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1300 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing 
Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000)). 
88 In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 855, 859 (6th Cir. 1992); In re DeLorean 
Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th Cir. 1985). 
89 Danielle Conway-Jones, Remedying Trademark Infringement: The Role of Bad Faith in 
Awarding an Accounting of Defendant’s Profits, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 863, 863-64 
(2002). 
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on the black-and-white language of the Lanham Act, there is no 
willfulness requirement to allow remedies for infringement, 90 yet the 
courts have been reluctant to award profits without at least a consideration 
of willfulness.91  The Fifth Circuit has been “the only” appellate court to 
consider how willfulness comports with the 1999 amendment to the 
Lanham Act.92 
 
2. The Third Circuit’s “Kinda, Sorta” Requirement of Willfulness 
 
[21] If SecuraComm is no longer binding precedent in the Third Circuit, 
willful infringement may still have “a central role” in alternative 
guidelines.93  To eliminate consideration of willfulness “would require 
awarding profits in all cases of infringement.”94  The appellate court 
admitted that its holding in SecuraComm may have changed after the 
Lanham Act amendment.95  It found, however, that by either standard the 
district court committed no error.96  Thus, the Third Circuit also 
considered the district court’s denial of profits a reasonable decision by 
the balance of equities.97 
 
C. Results 
 
1. Still Murky Rules Regarding Willfulness 
 
[22] Unfortunately, the Gucci court created no definite answer to clarify 
the muddied waters of Lanham Act jurisprudence.  In February 2003, 
                                                 
90 GILSON, supra note 12, at 20. 
91 See, e.g., Quick Techs., Inc. v. Sage Group PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 349 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(affirming a factor-based approach, including intent to confuse or deceive, to determine 
an accounting of profits), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 814 (2003). 
92 Gucci, 354 F.3d at 245 (Rosenn, J., dissenting); Quick Techs., 313 F.3d at 348-49. 
93 Gucci, 354 F.3d at 239.  See also Conway-Jones, supra note 81, at 864 (explaining 
that, despite an apparent Supreme Court answer of not requiring bad faith, subsequent 
circuit and district court decisions left a “schizophrenic view” of the issue).  SecuraComm 
was filed on Jan. 20, 1999, SecuraComm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 166 F.3d 
182 (3d Cir. 1999); the Lanham Act amendment was made on Nov. 29, 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 
1117 (2000). 
94 Gucci, 354 F.3d at 243. 
95 Id. at 242.  See also MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank, No. 02 Civ. 3691, 2004 
WL 326708, at *11 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2004) (explaining that the Third Circuit left 
open the issue of whether or not the existing precedent was altered by the 1999 
amendment). 
96 Gucci, 354 F.3d at 242. 
97 Id. at 243. 
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MasterCard and the First National Bank of Omaha disagreed regarding the 
use of trademarks “OneSmart” and “Smart One.”98  The district court 
pointed to cases from 1992 and 1996 to explain the law of the Second 
Circuit: as a prerequisite to recovery, “a plaintiff must prove that the 
infringer acted in bad faith.”99  The court explained that the part of the 
amendment to the Lanham Act that did not include “willful” merely 
affirms the “existing judicial interpretation of that language.”100  Without 
sufficient evidence of MasterCard’s willful infringement, the district court 
denied First National Bank’s motion for summary judgment on its claims 
for monetary relief.101  The Southern District of New York ruled on 
another trademark infringement case in 2003 bearing remarkable 
resemblance to Gucci.102  In its decision, the court did not point out the 
same precedents as its February case in awarding damages, nor did it 
make clear whether it still considered bad faith a prerequisite to awarding 
damages.  It relied on what it regarded as obvious willful action and 
awarded relief under the Lanham Act’s statutory damages provision.103 
 
2. The Decision Fell Short of the Statute’s Intent 
 
[23] The court’s decision in Gucci failed to penalize the infringer.  
Daffy’s voluntarily adopted a “no Gucci” policy, but, as the dissent 
pointed out, nothing prevented Daffy’s from rescinding that policy.104  In 
the meantime, Daffy’s netted $51,064 selling counterfeit Gucci 
handbags.105  The court assumed that the people who purchased the 
handbags thought they were buying genuine Gucci bags.106  To the 
contrary, New York City and the surrounding areas are known for having 
                                                 
98 MasterCard, 2004 WL 326708. 
99 Id. at *11 (quoting Int’l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A., 
Inc., 80 F.3d 749, 753 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
100 MasterCard, 2004 WL 326708, at *11. 
101 Id. at *12.  But cf. Int’l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A., 
Inc., No. 99-7329, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 660, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 12, 2000) (refusing to 
change the legal standard requiring a showing of bad faith to recover monetary damages 
after two remands). 
102 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, Ltd., 315 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), 
amended in part by Gucci Am., Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, Ltd., 328 F. Supp. 2d 439 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).   
103 Id. at 520.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (2000). 
104 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy’s, Inc., 354 F.3d 228, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2003) (Rosenn, J., 
dissenting). 
105 Id. at 246 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). 
106 Id. at 246 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). 
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designer handbags at discount prices, many of which are fake.  Not only is 
Daffy’s in a business involving “considerable risk,”107 but its customers 
must also have some concept of caveat emptor.  Proof that customers 
bought the product because of the trademark would be nearly impossible 
to obtain, short of polling the purchasers.  Whether customers bought them 
because they thought they were Gucci, thought they were good Gucci 
knockoffs, or thought they were nice bags even though they had no idea 
what the “GG” logo represented, is of no consequence because Daffy’s 
still profited from the unlawful use of Gucci’s mark.  It made money 
selling a product bearing a false trademark.  
 
[24] Daffy’s covered itself by attempting to authenticate the suspect 
bags and posing as an innocent infringer.108  In addition, the only deterrent 
preventing the discounter from selling counterfeit Gucci bags again is the 
fear of being dragged back into court. As such, the result of Gucci is that 
“innocent infringers are effectively immune from having to disgorge 
profits, despite the fact that innocence is no defense to a charge of 
infringement.”109 
 
V. FORECAST 
 
[25] The circuit courts have wrapped themselves in a quandary of 
inconsistent decisions.  Even though over ninety-five percent of trademark 
cases settle before trial,110 there is good potential for considerable legal 
discrepancies and a lot of forum shopping as a result.111 
 
A. Injunctive Relief 
 
[26] Without Supreme Court precedent or statutory overhaul, the 
principles of equity considerations and reasonable injunction terms will 
remain cloudy.  Each circuit has made up its own mind as to what 
comprises the principles of equity, and there are “sixty-six jurisdictions 
capable of making or changing trademark law, not to mention several 
                                                 
107 Id. at 244 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). 
108 Id. at 244.  Cf. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, Ltd., 315 F. Supp. 2d 511 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding willfulness existed when an infringer did not attempt a 
reasonable inquiry into the authenticity of the infringing goods it sold).  
109 GILSON, supra note 12, at 19. 
110 Id. at 6. 
111 See Id. at 20 (questioning why a plaintiff would file in the Second Circuit where 
additional hurdles must be jumped). 
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hundred individual district court judges.”112  While some may utilize the 
same factors, each may evaluate them differently, a practice that inevitably 
results in inconsistent decisions in varying courts based on similar 
circumstances. 
 
B. Profits 
 
[27] Again, absent binding precedent or statutory clarification, the 
ability to recover profits from the sale of infringing goods will continue to 
be determined based on different factors.  However, there is hope for more 
consistency as some courts appear to be shying away from their own 
statute-changing precedents.  For example, although the Third Circuit did 
not announce in Gucci that SecuraComm’s willful infringement 
requirement is no longer binding, it left the door open for that issue to be 
considered in the future.113  Similarly, even though the Southern District 
of New York refused to reconsider its requirement of bad faith, pointing 
out that it was inappropriate to change the legal standard after two 
remands, it did not close the door to the possibility that the legal standard 
was actually in need of changing.114 
 
[28] Unfortunately, the outcome in Gucci may have unintentionally 
opened a Pandora’s box.  Even if bad faith may no longer be a prerequisite 
to awarding damages, the Third Circuit still allowed Daffy’s to benefit 
from its infringement.115  It pointed to “[t]he price and quality of the 
handbags at issue, the small number of bags sold, Daffy’s status as an 
innocent infringer, and the possibility that Gucci could recover from the 
actual manufacturer of the bags” as justification for not awarding 
profits.116  Such a statement is extraordinarily helpful to counterfeiters 
who can now use that criterion to avoid a judgment against them. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
[29] The Third Circuit’s ruling in Gucci comported with the language 
of the Lanham Act but failed to reach its goals.  Trademarks are meant to 
protect both the mark owner and the public.  For as long as people have 
been making products, this has been the intention.  Congress added the 
                                                 
112 Id. at 3. 
113 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy’s, Inc., 354 F.3d 228, 241-42 (3d Cir. 2003). 
114 See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, Ltd., 315 F.Supp.2d 511 (S.D.N.Y 2004). 
115 See infra Part IV.C. 
116 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy’s, Inc., 354 F.3d 228, 242-43 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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protection to federal statutory law through the Lanham Act, providing 
civil action and remedies when a trademark is infringed.  However, these 
civil actions have created a body of jurisprudence as diverse as the judges 
who wrote the decisions.  
 
[30] Regrettably for Gucci, this has resulted in the sale of almost 600 
counterfeit accessories for which it received no compensation.  Further, 
the Third Circuit’s decision has done nothing to bestow Gucci with any 
confidence that the same discounter will be prevented from infringing on 
its trademark again in the future and profiting as a result. 
 
[31] Most notably at issue was the idea of willful infringement as a 
prerequisite to an awarding of damages or profits.  The court admitted that 
while willfulness or bad faith may not be a prerequisite to recovering 
profits, they could fit within factors and considerations the court uses to 
assess such a request.  As case precedent currently stands, some circuits 
consider willfulness a prerequisite while others do not.117  For the judicial 
system, this could mean increased forum shopping in trademark 
infringement claims.  However, the bottom line is that the outcome of 
Gucci proves that it is very possible that a court may permit an infringer to 
profit from its actions.  
                                                 
117 See GILSON, supra note 9, at § 14.03(3)(c)(i).  
